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SATTDI ARABIA 
A KINGDOM IN DECLINE? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the past, analysts have falsely predicted the demise of 
the Saudi regime, especially during the Pan-Arabist movement in 
the 1960s. Yet even at the peak of Pan-Arabist leader Gamal Abdul 
Nasser's popularity, the atmosphere that existed was not as 
potentially dangerous for the ruling monarchy as it is at 
present. Historically, when Saudi leaders were faced with 
political problems, they were able to throw large sums of money 
at them until they went away.  Today the Saudi regime may be on 
the verge of collapse because their vast surpluses accrued from 
oil revenues are gone, and the regime is no longer capable of 
buying off potential problem groups. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how decreasing oil 
prices have affected the political stability of the ruling regime 
in Saudi Arabia.  Other factors both internally and externally 
affect political stability in the kingdom, but the most 
significant is the decreasing price of oil.  Over two decades 
have passed since the oil embargo of 1973 transformed Saudi 
Arabia into one of the richest countries in the world.  One of 
the most significant consequences of that embargo was that it 
transformed the kingdom into a distributive (rentier) state and 
allowed extractive institutions and capabilities to erode away. 
In Chapter II, I analyze how vast oil revenues created a huge 
government bureaucracy and allowed it to distribute benefits 
(lucrative government jobs and subsidies) to its citizens, 
especially those who were friendly to the regime.  This vast 
wealth permitted the monarchy to displace the old merchant class, 
who were historically rivals, with a new commercial class drawn 
from supporters of the regime in the Nejd region.  Ironically, 
instead of building a foundation of stable supporters for the 
monarchy, this new class proved to be detrimental to the regime 
in the post-rentier economic-bust period of the 1980s. 
The Persian Gulf War gave impetus to other internal threats 
to the regime.  In Chapter III, I discuss how King Fahd was 
forced to loosen his grip on society to gather support for Shaykh 
Ibn Baz's fatwa that allowed foreign troops on Saudi soil to 
defend the country from advancing Iraqi forces.  Consequently, 
some groups were allowed to voice their opposition about the 
regime's policies, and since political organization is outlawed 
throughout the country and forbidden everywhere but inside the 
mosques, the most organized and viable threat is the Islamists, 
who represent the most significant political opposition. 
Many citizens feel that the social contract that they share 
with the government is being broken.  The relationship between 
the monarchy and its citizens is unique to the rentier state.  In 
most Western countries, the state taxes its citizens in return 
for benefits provided by the state and some say in governmental 
politics.  The inverse is true in Saudi Arabia.  There, citizens 
expect taxes from the government in the form of state benefits 
2 
and handouts in return for political acquiescence and support for 
the ruling regime. 
In Chapter IV, I discuss the prospects for the oil market. 
Most analysts agree that the price of oil will remain moderate or 
decrease in the foreseeable future.  If these experts are right, 
then the monarchy will be forced to react to the opposition 
groups calling for more political participation.  In Chapter V, I 
analyze the probable scenarios that could happen in Saudi Arabia, 
and I give suggestions for American policies that would not upset 
the political stability in the kingdom any further. 
Let us now turn to a more detailed presentation of the 
preceding assertions. 

II.  THE TRANSFORMATION OF SAUDI ARABIA INTO A RENTIER STATE 
This chapter is divided into three sections:  the first 
section gives a brief overview into historical Saudi Arabian 
society prior the oil,boom years; the second covers the period 
between 1973 and 1983 and focuses on changes during institutional 
structure and business-government relations in the economic boom; 
and the third covers the years between 1983 and 1990, when a 
decline in external capital inflows precipitated a severe 
recession that placed new demands on the state and tested the 
strength of boom-time coalitions.  The "boom" pattern stresses 
the institutional and political relationships that emerge in 
response to external capital inflows, while the "bust" pattern 
demonstrates how institutional and political relationships forged 
during the boom years break down in times of crises, conditioning 
policy outcomes in unexpected ways.1 
A. PRE-ECONOMIC BOOM ERA 
Before the discovery of oil during the 1930s, Saudi Arabia 
was regarded as one of the poorest regions in the world.  Not 
only was it lacking in natural resources and wealth, but it also 
was surrounded by vast deserts that kept it isolated from the 
rest of the world.  In clear contrast to the gulf shaykhdoms, 
^iren Aziz Chaudhry, "The Price of Wealth:  Business and 
State in Labor Remittance and Oil Economies."  International 
Organization.  Vol. 43, No. 1, Winter 1989, 103. 
Iraq or Jordan, the Saudi state was never formally colonized. 
King Abd al-Aziz did however rely heavily upon British 
subventions and the royalty payments of American oil companies to 
maintain his treasury in the period before World 
War II.  His major source of indigenous revenue, the pilgrimage 
tax, was greatly reduced during the worldwide depression of the 
1930s, when the number of pilgrims coming to the holy cities 
declined sharply.  The King's British adviser, H. St. John 
Philby, quotes him as saying during this period of financial 
crisis, "If anyone offers me a million pounds now, he would be 
welcome to all the concessions he wants in my country."2 The 
Arabian peninsula was as it had been for a thousand years, an 
impoverished region consisting of independent tribes and lacking 
central control. 
1. Reasons for Change 
Two unforeseeable factors were responsible for the change in 
Saudi Arabian society.  These factors were the brilliant 
charismatic leadership of Abd al Aziz al Saud, from 1902 until 
his death in 1953, and the discovery of the world's largest 
proven reserves of petroleum.  Without these two elements, the 
territory of Saudi Arabia may have remained the home of fractious 
nomads and tradition-bound peasants and townsmen, one of the most 
2F. Gregory Gause III.  Oil Monarchies:  Domestic and 
Security Challenges In The Arab Gulf States.  (New York:  Council 
of Foreign Relations Press, 1994) 44. 
backward regions of the Arab world.  Abd al Aziz united the 
deserts and the towns by linking together tribal loyalties with 
Islamic institutions.  The fortuitous discovery of oil provided 
the resources to secure the new kingdom for his heirs and to 
begin its transformation into a modern society unlike any before 
known in its history.3 
The alliance between the Saudis and the Wahhabis 
accompanying the founding of the nation centered on symbols and 
institutions indigenous to Arabia, tribalism and Islam.  The 
exploitation of oil brought to the peninsula ideas and influences 
totally foreign to its history that precipitated the 
modernization process of the primitive economy in Saudi Arabia. 
Foreign workers from the West and the rest of the world began 
arriving in Saudi Arabia, bringing with them foreign ideas and 
philosophies.  New types of conflicts arose from ARAMCO (Arabian- 
American Oil Company) workers who went on strike twice.  Once in 
1953, when workers demanded better working conditions.  And in 
1956, when workers demonstrated against the government which was 
intent on renewing the lease which gave the United States access 
to Dhahran Air Base for its forces.4  In short, the discovery of 
oil ended the kingdom's isolation by bringing it into the 
3Richard F. Nyrop, ed.  Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, 
Washington DC:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, 131. 
""Challenge to the House of Saud."  The Economists.  October 
I, 1994, Vol. 333, no. 7884, p. 41. 
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twentieth century. 
2. Extractive Institutions in Pre-boom Society 
In the decade before the oil boom, the economic policies of 
Saudi Arabia were typical of many third world developing 
countries:  imports were restricted; import substitution projects 
were initiated in the western province of the Hijaz; indirect 
taxes were expanded; and periodic temporary taxes were imposed to 
meet the military needs of the state.  Up until 1969, government 
extractive capacities were primitive compared to Western 
governments but they did exist and were expanding.  Custom duties 
were a valuable source of revenue.  The zakat tax was being 
collected in the Hassa and Asir provinces.  Even non-sedentary 
tribes from the central province of the Nejd were pursued and 
taxed.  In the urban areas of the Hijaz, a uniform tax rate based 
on the previous Hashemite system was being introduced.  The 
extractive apparatus of the Saudi state in this initial period 
was diverse, reflecting the many divisions within the pre- 
monetary economy.5 
3. Political Opposition 
The population of Saudi Arabia is divided into many 
different regions.  The two dominant groups that are focused on 
in this chapter are the tribal warriors from the Nejd region and 
the old merchant class of the Hijaz region. 
5Chaudhry, 119, 
Even after the Saudis from the Nejd region conquered and 
consolidated the peninsula, the Hijazi merchants were an 
important component in Saudi society.  The Nejdi tribal 
supporters tended to dominate the bureaucracy, but the Hijazis 
worked as administrators.  The merchants in the Hijaz region also 
participated in the lucrative Red Sea trade, and they serviced 
the Hajj economy.  This self-regulated and well-organized middle 
class continued to dominate commerce all the way up until the 
mid-1970s. 
Historically, the Hijazi merchants opposed first the 
Hashemite rulers and then the Saudis because of irregular taxes 
in the western provinces of Jeddah, Mecca and Medina.  The 
Hijazis felt they were carrying the burden of paying state taxes 
and not receiving their due benefits.  Well into the 1960s, the 
Hijazi merchants resisted the domination of the Al Saud family 
and demanded representation (granted in the reign of King Abd al 
Aziz and withdrawn by King Feisal), government accountability, 
and a say in the way that state funds were spent.  The "Hijaz for 
the Hijazis" movement was the longest lasting opposition to the 
rule of the Al Saud, though not the most violent.  Significantly, 
at the onset, the old merchant class of Saudi Arabia was not 
powerless or unorganized.  Indeed, it was able to extract 
concessions on such crucial issues as representation and 
commercial law.6 
In sum, before Saudi Arabia was transformed into a rentier 
state, extractive and regulatory institutions were not only- 
present in the kingdom, but expanding.  Prior to the early 1970s, 
the central government of Saudi Arabia was engaged in the 
difficult process of extending control over their national 
territories through a combination of expanding administration, 
taxation, and infrastructure and soliciting the cooperation of 
merchants and tribal leaders.  In this case, government was 
dominated by one group and business by another significant group. 
B.  ECONOMIC-BOOM PERIOD 1973-1983 
1.  Consequences of a Rentier Economy 
The oil boom originated after the 1973 War, when the Saudis 
and other members of OPEC conducted a boycott against the Western 
countries who supported Israel.  Oil revenues in Saudi Arabia 
quickly jumped from $2.7 billion in 1972 to $22.6 billion in 
1974.  The immediate effects that followed were huge government 
surpluses and large increases in expenditure.  Between 1973 and 
1982, salaries and benefits, as well as current expenditure, grew 
thirteen-fold.7 
6Ibid. 
7Giacomo Luciani, ed.  The Arab State.  (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990,) 136. 
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The primary result of these vast oil revenues, has been the 
transformation of Saudi Arabia into a rentier state.  A rentier 
state is one in which government relies for the lion's share of 
its revenues on direct transfers from the international economy, 
in the form of oil revenues, foreign aid, or other kinds of 
direct payments. The political effects of the rentier type of 
economy are enormous.  The relationship between state and the 
rest of society is much different from anything known in the 
past.  As a result, a new social contract between the regime and 
its citizens was formed. 
A number of very specific political precepts of the social 
contract flow from the rentier character of Saudi Arabia.  First, 
the government is the dominant player in the local economy.  Even 
nominal private sector activities, like the construction and 
retail sectors, depend upon government spending.  Access to 
capital controlled by the government and government licenses 
require permission from the state before business can be 
accomplished.  By exercising such a large role in the economy, 
government can vest a wide array of private interests in its 
stability, privileging its allies and punishing its enemies. 
Second, governments can provide a wide array of services directly 
to citizens, in the form of free or heavily subsidized education, 
health care, housing, consumer goods, and services.  Again, the 
intention is to provide benefits with the aim of gaining 
political loyalty or denying such benefits (through deportation 
11 
or deprivation of citizenship) to those who oppose the^ 
government. 
Third, the vast resources at the disposal of most of the 
Saudi monarchy have allowed it to build up large government 
apparatuses, in both the civil and military areas.  Government 
jobs are another form of patronage distributed to citizens.  The 
expanded state apparatus also provides the government with more 
levers to control society, through oversight functions of the 
civil bureaucracy, as well as through the secret police and 
military.  Since 1950, the number of ministries in the Saudi 
bureaucracy has grown from four to 20, and over 40 public 
authorities and corporations have been established since 1950. 
Civil service employees, who numbered no more than a few hundred 
in 1950, increased to about 37,000 in 1962-3, to 85,000 in 1970- 
71 and to over 245,000 in 1979-80.8 
For the monarchy, this massive bureaucracy serves as a 
respectable and modern-looking method of distributing part of the 
revenues.  Unlike traditional, straightforward handouts, 
bureaucracy provides a more dignified way of sharing the wealth. 
Through the creation of a bureaucracy, the rulers of the oil 
states are paying the citizen - by way of lucrative government 
employment - in return for a cessation of the old tribal wars, 
for tacit acceptance of the political supremacy of one tribe or 
3Luciani, 132. 
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fraction of a tribe (the royal or princely family) over the 
others.  What the central administration does for the modern 
urban sector, the system of local subsidies achieves for the 
rural and nomadic areas.  The taxation function is thus reversed 
in the oil state: instead of the usual situation, where the state 
taxes the citizen in return for services, here the citizen taxes 
the state, by acquiring a government payment, in return for 
staying quiet, for not invoking tribal rivalries and for not 
challenging the ruling family's position.9 
The relationship that is being established between the 
official and the state is quite complex.  On the one hand he 
knows that the state (or more specifically the ruling family) 
needs his acquiescence; on the other he knows that he needs a 
public post not only for the financial benefits it offers him, 
but also for the contacts it provides (which are indispensable 
for the conduct of private business).  In the short run, the 
official is tempted to feel that he is in the stronger position, 
that the state needs him more than he needs the state and that he 
can bargain with the state over the price of acquiescence. 
Finally, the nature of the rentier economy has directly and 
indirectly weakened, if not destroyed, the economic basis of 
groups that in the past were sources of potential opposition to 
the state;  most notably tribes and labor organizations. 
9Luciani, 144. 
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Concentration of resources in the hands of the state has allowed 
ruling families to consolidate power and political positions in 
their hands to an extent unknown in previous generations.10 
Hence, it is no longer correct to say that the political 
system in Saudi Arabia is based primarily upon tribalism and 
islam.  The state now provides directly to the individual many of 
the benefits that in the past came from the tribe.  Tribal 
shaykhs are now on the state payroll.  The main benefit tribes 
now perform is helping people both economically and politically 
by linking them to the people who are in power.  Likewise, the 
institutions of Islam are now much more dependent upon the state, 
and much more a subordinate part of the state apparatus, than was 
the case in the past.  Members of the ulama are appointed by the 
state, and mosques are now funded by the state.  The large oil 
revenues received by the state have become a dual edge sword for 
the government.  On the one side, subordinate groups that in the 
past may have challenged the government are now supplanted by 
groups that have been usually supportive of the regime. On the 
downside, when crises appear, these primordial groups with close 
ties to the government have greater ability to influence 
government policy and block needed austerity reforms. 
10Gause, 48. 
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2.  Extractive and Distributive Institutions During the Boom 
Years 
Initially, modest oil revenues were used by the state to 
increase their power over other groups that held power in the 
country, namely, the Hijazi merchants.  By taxing the merchant 
class, the state was able to relieve much of the burden from 
tribesmen, nomads and farmers.  After the 1973 surpluses, the 
need to tax disappeared.  This had a tremendous impact on Saudi 
society because a society that is not taxed is less likely to 
demand political participation.  "No need for representation, 
without taxation" is the inverse to one of the basic principles 
upon which the American democracy was founded.  Furthermore, the 
extractive institutions in the government apparatus mostly 
withered away or disappeared altogether.  For example, the once 
powerful Department of Zakat and Income Tax (DZIT) became 
nonfunctioning, limiting itself to occasional audits of 
delinguent foreign companies.  In the United States, this would 
be similar to the Internal Revenue Service ceasing to exist. 
One category of distributive measures that replaced the 
extractive measures included large interest-free loans for 
housing, personal needs, industry, contracting, and agriculture, 
administered by the Real Estate, Saudi, Industrial, Contracting, 
and Agricultural Development Funds.11  If land grants formed the 
nChaudhry, 127. 
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basis for wealth, the regional and tribal ties between the grant, 
subsidy, and loan applicants and the civil servants assumed great 
importance in making the wealth grow.  In light of the social 
composition of the bureaucracy, it is not surprising that the 
subsidies and the lending policies of the Saudi Agricultural, 
Industrial, and Real Estate Funds are enormously skewed in their 
regional distribution.  In most cases, between 60 and 80 percent 
of the projects funded are in the central region, the home of the 
Al Saud and their chief tribal supporters.  The skews in 
government lending are even more remarkable when seen in light of 
the fact that the Nejd constitutes no more than 10 percent of the 
total Saudi population.12 
Institutions that relied on local initiative and resource 
mobilization, such as local cooperative societies and 
agricultural outreach programs, were stripped of their legal 
status.  According to Chaudhry, the traditional service guilds of 
the Hijaz were disbanded and their members placed under the 
Ministry of pilgrimage and Religious Endowments.  The organic 
merchant associations of the Hijaz, including the powerful al- 
Majlis al-Tijari, or Trade Council, were forced to relocate under 
the state-funded Chambers of Commerce. 
The 1973-83 period had a tremendous impact on Saudi society. 
Oil wealth led to the decline of extractive and regulatory 
12Chaudhry, 12 8. 
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institutions, created a large number of distributive 
institutions, and undercut participatory institutions.  Yet what 
may have been the most significant consequence, was the creation 
of a new commercial class.  Thousands of lucrative government 
jobs created by the expanding government bureaucracy were given 
to Nejdi tribal leaders, the historic supporters of the monarchy. 
Also, the division between public and private sector became 
intertwined, as many government civil servants had their own 
businesses along with their government jobs.  According to a 
survey conducted in 1971, 2 6 percent of top-level bureaucrats 
said that they saw their employment in the government as an 
opportunity to combine private and public interests. Because of 
the sheer size of the state's role in the economy, the 
affiliations of bureaucrats during the boom period greatly 
influenced social stratification and the composition of the 
emerging private sector.13 By having ties to the government, 
these businessmen were reaping enormous commissions from foreign 
companies bidding for government contracts. 
Needless to say, it was not long before this new commercial 
class based on tribal and regional lines precipitated the demise 
of the old merchant houses of Jeddah, Mecca, Medina, and the 
Eastern province.  This gave rise to an entirely inexperienced 
and state-created group of commission entrepreneurs with strong 
"Chaudry, 125. 
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links to the state. The new business group is highly solicitous 
of state support and finance.  Cost and price subsidies to make 
domestic goods competitive with imports are expected as a matter 
of course for factories that are themselves financed by grants, 
production stipends, and interest-free loans.  During the boom 
years, the Saudi state was the generous provider, simultaneously 
funding the protection of local industry, ensuring high profits 
for importers, and subsidizing consumers.14 
C.   PROBLEMS IN A POST-RENTIER STATE: ECONOMIC BUST PERIOD 
1982-1990 
Despite all other factors, a rentier state with a sufficient 
amount of incoming rents could exist forever.  However, because 
of decreasing oil prices in the 1980s, the vast surpluses accrued 
by the monarchy from oil rents began to dissipate.  When the 
standard of living began to fall, citizens began to view those 
same generous providers as corrupt and inefficient tyrants. 
During this period, annual oil rents plummeted from over $110 
billion in the 1973-82 period to about $22.68 billion in 1986. 
In March 198 6, King Fahd appeared on Saudi television to announce 
that flux in international oil prices precluded the possibility 
of designing a national budget.  Real estate prices plummeted as 
foreigners departed, leaving a 60 percent overcapacity in 
14Chaudry, 136 
housing; banks held massive doubtful loans.15  Still the most 
dramatic consequence to come out of Saudi Arabia during the 
global recession in the 1980s was the fact that the country had 
been transformed into a distributive state and the state lacked 
the relations with its citizens that would may have arisen in a 
extractive state and allowed it to carry out economic reforms. 
1.  State Problems in Economic-bust Period 
The problems in Saudi Arabia were two-fold.  First, the 
extractive and regulatory institutions that were allowed to 
atrophy during the economic boom period were not capable of 
implementing new reform policies.  Second, the new commercial 
class that the monarchy created to bolster regime stability, 
began to see state subsidies as a right of citizenship and balked 
at any kind of economic reform aimed at pruning their subsidies. 
A decade of underfunding and neglect left the state without 
the apparatus to collect any type of direct tax (corporate, 
individual, or religious).  At best the Saudi reform program 
succeeded in implementing policies directed at the general 
population and foreign laborers.  It failed in carrying through 
changes that would have targeted the merchant class. The 
infrastructure did not exist for Department of Zakat and Income 
Tax (DZIT) to obtain information on business contracts.  And if 
the information did exist, companies usually found loopholes in 
15Ibid. 
Sharia law to allow them to escape paying taxes.  According to 
Kiren Aziz Chaudhry:16 
The new taxes on services affected 
foreign laborers and individuals.  Beginning 
in late 1985, indirect fees were collected on 
cigarettes, and a new head tax was charged 
for pilgrims.  Profit taxes on foreign 
companies were reinstated, although their 
application awaits the complete 
reorganization of DZIT.  Customs duties were 
increased to levels outlined in the Geneva 
Convention, and indirect taxes on passports, 
vehicle registration, visas, mailboxes, and 
stamps were raised by several hundred 
percent.  Port and airport fees were 
reinstated for foreign transporters. The new 
indirect taxes were easily collected through 
the Motor Vehicles and Customs Departments 
and the Ministry of Communications. 
If nothing else, this brought home the fact that the only 
economic tool possessed by the Saudi state was distribution- 
indirect taxes could be applied, but the economy could not be 
restructured in the lean years. 
Other laws meant to strike at the affluent commercial class 
by taxing utilities, gasoline and agriculture drew sharp 
criticism and were withdrawn.  Agriculture is a perfect example 
of a money pit that the government pours resources into annually, 
even though the country does not possess any kind of comparative 
advantage.  Ironically, Saudi Arabia is the sixth largest wheat 
exporter in the world, despite existing in a hostile climate with 
"Chaudhry, 138. 
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limited water resources.  The result is that the government has 
to heavily subsidize the industry that employs about ten percent 
of the population and wastes valuable water resources in the 
process .17 
In their opposition to regulation and tax, the Saudi private 
sector mobilized both primordial links and economic ties with 
bureaucrats and the Royal Family.  Apart from the wheat farmers' 
use of local newspapers to voice their complaints, the grievances 
were expressed and heard behind closed doors.  Remarkably, there 
was no struggle:  the austerity programs were simply and quietly 
withdrawn.  The complaints of the business class were so 
effective that favored local businessmen were promised a 
guaranteed source of future income through the massive 
privatization program launched in 1987.  Stocks in state-owned 
enterprises will be underpriced and profits heavily subsidized, 
at substantial cost to the government. 
In summary, the consequences of the economic boom era in 
Saudi Arabia have been dramatic.  The transformation from an 
extractive state to a distributive (rentier) state seemed to have 
been a relatively peaceful process due to a large volume of 
external capital inflows.  However, economic policy during the 
recession revealed the danger of allowing the decaying of 
regulatory institutions and strong civil groups.  Previously 
"Andrew Apostolou. "Never Mind the Cost."  The Middle East. 
Feb 1992, n208, p. XIV. 
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strong groups in the Hijaz were disbanded and corporate groups 
were created directly through state spending.  Rather than 
forming a loyal political base, continued financial support from 
the state was a prerequisite for the private sector's 
acquiescence.  Ironically, opposition to austerity measures was 
spearheaded not by the disenfranchised Hijazis, not by the 
impoverished populations of Asir and Hassa, but by the two main 
beneficiaries of Saudi state spending:  the state-sponsored 
landed elite and the new Nejdi merchant and industrial class. 
Saudi foreign reserves are being depleted at the rate of $1 
billion per month.  The standard of living for many Saudis has 
decreased, and the government is experiencing difficulties 
attempting to borrow from international organizations.  Adding to 
the King's problems was the Persian Gulf War of 1991.  The 
monarchy was forced to loosen its grip on society to garner 
support for the war effort.  By opening up society, some 
political opposition was allowed to be voiced.  Couched in 
supportive terms initially, soon Islamic Fundamentalist groups 
were accusing the monarchy of being corrupt and calling for major 
political reforms. 
In light of these developments, the Saudi government can 
hardly continue the present policy of accommodation indefinitely. 
Hence, the monarchy is now faced with a dilemma, how to reform 
the country economically, while at the same time maintaining 
political stability. 
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III.  POLITICAL ISLAMISM IN SAUDI ARABIA 
This chapter analyzes the origins of the new Islamist 
movement in Saudi Arabia and the threat that it imposes on the 
ruling monarchy.  It follows conclusions derived from previous 
chapters that the oil boom of the 1970s transformed the country 
into a rentier state and this transformation was significant in 
that it allowed the expansion of a giant government apparatus 
that eventually coopted religious and tribal leaders, who then 
became part of the state apparatus.  Consequently, the large oil 
revenues accrued by the state also allowed it to form a new 
social contract between the regime and its citizens.  The 
contract basically charged the state with maintaining benefits to 
its citizens by distributing the revenues gained through the 
export of petroleum products. 
The declining oil revenues during the oil bust of the 1980s 
forced the regime to tighten its domestic budget, which meant the 
elimination of some of the benefits provided to the citizens. 
This break in the social contract was the catalyst for vocal 
opposition against the regime and for calls for more political 
participation.  Since political organization is outlawed 
throughout the country and forbidden everywhere except inside the 
mosque, the Islamist movement has a monopoly on organized 
political opposition.  Hence, the Islamic movements are expanding 
rapidly and pose a more serious threat to political stability of 
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the ruling monarchy than any of the other groups.  In this 
chapter five questions are asked and analyzed about the rising 
Islamist movement in Saudi Arabia:18 
1.  Who are the Islamists?   The members of the new Islamist 
movement in Saudi Arabia are mostly a shapeless group who prefer 
to call themselves al-Salafiyyun - the followers of the pious 
ancestors rather than fundamentalists.  Most are former students 
of Shaykh Ibn Baz, the supreme religious leader in Saudi Arabia, 
but have turned against their former mentor because of his 
support for the government.  The loose coalition consists of 
religious teachers (ulama), judges, academics, businessmen, heads 
of religious institutes, mosque imams, and other notables 
(business/teachers).  The majority come from a religious 
background, are highly educated and live in the Nejd region.  The 
most disturbing aspect to the regime is that the new Islamists 
are Sunni Muslims who come from the region that is historically 
supportive of the regime, and they are not supported by external 
forces, an allegation that some in the government charge. 
18The format was first used by Dr. Alan Richards in his 
unpublished manuscript entitled "Toward A Political Economy of 
Islamism:  Grievances and Collective Action",  April, 1995. 
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2. Why are they angry?  The oil bust of the 1980s and 1990s 
caused economic downturn and government budgetary restraint 
coinciding with the acceleration of new entrants into the labor 
force. The standard of living fell for many citizens, excluding 
the royal family.  Many of the Islamists feel the ruling regime 
is responsible for the economic downturn of the country and 
accuse them of being inefficient, corrupt and tied too closely 
with the West, especially, the United States. 
3. How did this happen?  The catalysts for the current Islamist 
movements arise from two major events.  First, the social 
contract that established the regime's relationship with its 
citizens was broken when the decline in oil prices during the 
1980s turned a huge government surplus into a $19 billion dollar 
deficit.  Domestic tightening of the budget caused benefits that 
were once seen as rights of citizenship disappear at the same 
time the demographic surge created a large percentage of young 
males looking for social identity and state employment.  Next, 
the reliance on Western armies to defend the country during the 
Persian Gulf War made many citizens wonder why after spending 
billions of dollars annually on military hardware, they had to 
rely on the assistance of "infidels" for their defense. 
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4. What are the Islamists demanding?  The demands include calls 
for more political participation outside the ruling family, the 
creation of a constitution and legislative assembly and movement 
of the government back towards Islamic principles and away from 
Western allies.  In general, the Islamists are not calling for 
the end of the monarchy but a stricter implementation of the 
Sharia. 
5. How did the King respond?  The monarchy responded with calls 
for moderation and warnings to the Islamists not to go too far. 
A new Basic System of Government was set up that created a 
legislative assembly, picked by the King.  Also, a Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs was established which symbolizes that the King is 
trying to be more Islamic than the Islamists. 
A.  WHO ARE THE ISLAMISTS? 
It is ironic to think that domestic security in Saudi 
Arabia, the most Muslim fundamentalist (Wahabbi) country in the 
world, is being threatened by indigenous Sunni Islamic 
fundamentalist groups.19 The basic tenet of legitimacy of the 
Saud ruling regime is that they are the guardians of the Holy 
places in Mecca and Medina.  The origins of the regime were 
forged by a coalition between tribes and religious 
19From here on referred to as Islamists. 
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fundamentalists.  This relationship between the regime and its 
historical allies was paramount, until the discovery of oil and 
the transformation of the country into a rentier state.  The 
consequences of the rentier state have been very significant. 
First, the Saudi government apparatus expanded and eventually 
coopted their previous allies.  Tribal and religious leaders 
became employees of state.  The regime used state-sponsored 
religious figures (the highest ranking is Shaykh Ibn Baz) to 
justify government policy.  One of the most controversial issues 
was the "fatwa" issued by Baz that allowed Western troops on 
Saudi soil to defend against Iraq during the Persian Gulf War of 
1990-91. 
Consequently, the "social contract" between the regime and 
its historical supporters has been eroding away. Declining oil 
revenues and living standards, socioeconomic inequity amid 
increasing urbanization, the impact of modernization and the 
spread of Western cultural influences, all became catalysts of a 
new Islamist upsurge.20 
The Islamists in Saudi Arabia are a loose coalition, similar 
to Islamists groups in other parts of the Arab world.  The main 
distinction between the Islamists in Saudi Arabia compared to 
other parts of the Middle East is that they were once loyal 
supporters of the regime who now call for reforms within the 
20Discussed in more detail in section D. 
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existing system instead of complete transformation.  This is 
simply because Saudi Arabia is already an Islamic state that the 
Islamists presume is being led astray by its current leaders. 
The Islamist coalition is roughly composed of a group of former 
students of Shaykh Ibn Baz who turned against him because of 
supposed collaboration with the regime.  Historically, they are 
known as al-Hadith, the puritanical followers of the Prophet's 
exemplary life, his sayings and his deeds, to the exclusion of 
analogy and opinion.21 Among them include Juhayman's22 al-Ikhwan 
of the 1970s (infamous for the Grand Mosque seizure in 1979) and 
the Salafiyyun, the present day Islamists of the 1990s. 
1.  Beginning of the Modern Islamist Movement: 
November, 1979 
The initial uprising for the modern Islamist movement came 
in November 1979, during the waning days of the annual pilgrimage 
for Muslims from around the world, when Juhayman al-Utaybi and 
his band of religious zealots forcefully took over the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca.  Juhayman claimed that the Saudi regime had lost 
its right to rule because it had strayed from the tenets of 
21Hrair R. Dekmejian.  "The Rise of Political Islamism in 
Saudi Arabia."  The Middle East Journal.  Middle East Institute, 
Volume 48, Number 4, Autumn 1994, 635. 
22It is important to highlight the differences between 
Juhayman and the present day Islamists.  Today's Islamists call 
themselves reformers and insist that they abhor violence such as 
Juhayman called for sixteen years ago.  Juhayman and his gang 
were revolutionaries who called for the radical overthrow of the 
ruling regime. 
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Wahhabi Islam upon which the kingdom had been built.  While the 
Ikhwan cause had sympathizers among both urban and tribal 
fundamentalist groups, many Saudis considered seizure of the 
mosque an illegitimate act carried out by a group that was not 
representative of mainstream Saudi Islamists.23 Yet the siege of 
the Grand Mosque raised more fundamental questions relating to 
the legitimacy and credibility of the dynasty.  Juhayman and his 
followers may have belonged to the lunatic fringe of Islam, but 
they were representative of a current in the country towards a 
reversion to fundamentalist values and against the West and its 
technological innovations. 
The most disturbing aspect of the Grand Mosque seizure was 
the spectacular nature of the breakdown in law and order in the 
most sensitive of all places in the kingdom.  It took two weeks 
for the Islamists to be driven from the mosque, and after each 
additional day, Saudi credibility and legitimacy as protector of 
the holy places was compromised.  In the end, the Saudis required 
assistance from French special forces to clear the area.24 
23David Holden and Richard Johns.  The House of Saud.  New 
York:  Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981, 528. 
24I first heard that this fact was not well publicized in 
the press in Dr. Ahmad Ghoreishi's lectures at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in the Spring of 1995.  I validated it by 
comparing several scholarly journals and publications written at 
the time of the incident. 
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2. The Salafiyyun 
The present day Islamists are also former students of Shaykh 
Ibn Baz.  An analysis of the Salafiyyun signers of two petitions 
sent by the Islamists to the government in May of 1991 and 
September of 1992 discloses a profile that is disturbing to the 
regime.  Most of the signers (68%) were from the Nejd, the 
historic stronghold of Saudi support.  Further, fifty-eight 
percent had a religious background, but not a religious 
occupation.  The largest single group represented were academics 
(50%), most were highly educated in the technical sciences 
(fifty-six percent had a lower degree and forty-four percent held 
doctorate degrees).  About a dozen had some record of activism as 
critics of the regime.25 
3. Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) 
Another threat to the regime comes from an Islamist group 
that was formed in May of 1993.  It was formed by a group of six 
Saudi dissidents, including three Muslim scholars. They announced 
the formation of what they described as the country's first 
committee for human rights.  They believed they could use this 
platform to press demands to further institutionalize the power 
of the Islamic clergy over Saudi society and restrain the pace of 
25See Appendix C. 
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modernization.26 The group, headed by Sheik Abdallah Masari, 
asserted that its goal was "to alleviate injustice and defend the 
right secured by Islamic law." Two of the six members of the 
group signed the petition submitted to King Fahd last September. 
Specifically, the group is critical of Saudi economic 
policies that allow interest on banking (considered usury by the 
Koran, Islam's holy book), too heavy a dependence on the West in 
foreign, defense and economic policy, and a legal system that is 
not fully based on the Islamic Sharia law.  Like more liberal 
critics of the regime, they are demanding an end to inefficiency 
and corruption in the government administration and to the 
continuing favoritism toward members of the royal family. The 
militants also attacked the leaders of the Saudi religious 
establishment, accusing them of being puppets of the Saudi 
government, especially Shaykh Ibn Baz. 
In the beginning, the Saudi government, sensitive to any 
internal conflict, was unusually lenient on groups like the CDLR. 
However the limits seemed to have been reached with the forming 
of this particular group.  The Saudi government immediately 
removed the leaders from their positions at the university and 
ordered the closure of two fundamentalist lawyer's offices.  The 
leadership of the group was arrested and imprisoned for six 
months.  Eventually, after their release they quietly left the 
26Chris Hedges.  "Saudi Rulers Resisting Pressure From Two 
Sides." New York Times.  February 14, 1993. 
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country and moved their organization to London.27 
Over a short period of time, the CDLR succeeded in mounting 
an unprecedented challenge to the monarchy by becoming the 
primary channel of opposition for both the Islamist and non- 
Islamist critics of the regime. Through a series of communiques 
faxed to Saudi Arabia and world-wide, the CDLR sought to mobilize 
public opinion against the monarchy by documenting human rights 
violations, denouncing Saudi support of southern Yemen's 
"communist" rebels, and criticizing the regime's mishandling of 
the 1994 pilgrimage that resulted in many more deaths than 
officially were reported.  Despite its bitter attacks, the CDLR 
advocated moderation and peaceful change in the kingdom on the 
basis of the Sharia principles, as outlined in the 1991 petition 
and the 1992 memorandum.28 
B.  WHY ARE THEY ANGRY? 
The people who oppose the government in Saudi Arabia are 
angry because the decrease in the price of oil has led to a lower 
standard of living for many citizens outside the royal family. 
They blame the monarchy for the economic downturn in the country 
and accuse the royal family of being corrupt and inefficient for 
27
 Kim Murphy.  "Saudi Arabia's Exiles Challenge a Closed 
Society:  The Dissents want the Kingdom to be More Democratic and 
More Islamic."  Los Angeles Times.  July 19, 1994. 
28Discussed in more detail in section E. 
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mishandling the country's economic and foreign policies. 
Particularly, they wonder why after spending billions of dollars 
on defense every year, they had to rely on Western armies to 
defend them from Saddam Husayn during the Persian Gulf War. 
Significantly, these groups are forbidden to form organized 
protest movements of their own, so they ally themselves with the 
Islamist groups.  The Islamists are specifically angered by close 
ties to the West because they are threatened by Western culture. 
They are also upset about the hypocrisy of the regime because 
they use Islamic symbols for political legitimization but live 
their personal lives guite contrary to Islamic principles. 
After twenty years of receiving state benefits derived from 
oil, a substantial part of the citizenry has ceased to regard 
state benefits as temporary benefices from their rulers, and has 
come to see them as rights of citizenship.  The fact that Saudi 
Arabia has a substantial number of noncitizens who do not share 
in many of these benefits reinforces the notion that citizens are 
different, in part because governments have an obligation to 
provide certain economic rights to them.  Along with this 
obligation, the monarchy has also taken on, over the last twenty 
years, a more general obligation to encourage economic growth and 
safeguard the health of the economy as a whole.  On both personal 
and national levels, citizens increasingly hold the state 
accountable for economic conditions.  In the "boom years" state 
hegemony over the economy was a source of stability for the 
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members of the monarchy, but now that funds are more scarce, it 
may come back to haunt them.29 
Along with the recession in the 1980s, another thing the 
Islamists are angry about is the political crisis generated by 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  Saddam Husayn directly challenged 
the legitimacy not just of the Kuwaiti regime, but of all the 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) , on both Arab 
nationalist and Islamic bases.  The presence of American troops 
raised questions among citizens about the ability of their 
governments to defend them, even after billions of dollars of oil 
wealth had been spent on defense.  The intense international 
focus on the region also led to some degree of self-examination. 
All of these factors led the Saudi citizens to question the 
morality and efficiency of the economic policies of the 
government. 
For these Islamic groups, all that is wrong with society can 
be attributed to moving away from the virtues and principles of 
Islam.  For them, Islam becomes the panacea to correct all ills 
in society, via the infusion throughout society with Islamic 
principles that they suggest the current ruling regime has 
strayed away from.  They feel that the monarchy is not legitimate 
to lead in the name of Islam because of corruption and hypocrisy 
29F. Gregory Gause,  III.  Oil Monarchies:  Domestic and 
Security Challenges In The Arab Gulf States.  New York:  Council 
of Foreign Relations Press, 1994, 81 . 
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shown by the royal family.  The Islamists are also opposed to 
close identification to the West and Israel, and economic 
interdependency on the West.  They feel Western ideology and 
culture threatens their society. 
C.  HOW DID THIS HAPPEN? 
The current rise of Islamist movements can be attributed to 
two major factors.  First, the oil bust years (1982-1990s) forced 
the state to tighten its belt by cutting benefits and jobs to 
ordinary citizens at the same time that modernization in society 
created a huge demographic surge in young males looking for 
government employment.  Second, the Persian Gulf War of 1991 
opened up society enough to allow some opposition to voice their 
opinions in public. 
1.  Post-Oil Boom Era 
The oil bust of the 1980s and 1990s that caused economic 
downturn and forced government budget tightening, coincided with 
the acceleration of a surge of new entrants to the labor force. 
Modernization resulted in rapid rural-urban migration.  From 1970 
to 1990, urban populations grew at about 4.4 percent per year, 
while populations grew at 3.2 percent.  By 1994, 65 percent of 
the citizens were under nineteen.30 
The precipitous drop in world oil prices in 1986, after a 
30See Appendix D. 
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steady decline from the heights of the early 1980s, triggered an 
economic crisis in Saudi Arabia.  Gross Domestic Product, which 
had been increasing at substantial rates for the previous fifteen 
years, fell during the 1980s.  The government drew down reserves 
to maintain most state services, but still had to cut back on the 
spending that fuels local economies.  Some local businesses went 
bankrupt, unemployment emerged for the first time in nearly two 
decades as a problem and the boom mentality of previous years 
came to an abrupt end.  This economic shock led to a new 
awareness of the fragility of the monarchy's prosperity and thus 
to demands for more efficient and accountable government economic 
policies.  Many of the youth viewed the government as inefficient 
and corrupt.  The Islamists viewed the regimes as having strayed 
away from the tenets of Islam. 
The final factor that served as a catalyst for the rise in 
Islamism was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990.  The Gulf 
War between the allied forces of Saudi Arabia and Western allies 
against Saddam Husayn and Iraq left several lingering factors 
that shook Saudi stability even more.  First, there was the 
fifty-five billion dollar price tag that expedited the downward 
trend of the depressed Saudi economy.  Next, the monarchy had to 
release its grip on society in order to gather support for Ibn 
Baz's fatwa allowing Western armies on "holy soil" to provide for 
their security. 
Until the War, most Islamist groups refrained from directly 
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challenging the government.  Instead, they attached some 
guardedly liberal officials as "secularists", while pressing for 
"social reform" and propagating their puritanical ideology.31 
The Gulf War transformed the situation by revealing the kingdom's 
weakness relative to Iraq and its dependence on Western 
protection.  With the deployment of the US-led multinational 
forces, the kingdom became host to thousands of American and 
European soldiers, both men and women.  This undermined the 
Islamic legitimacy of the monarchy and angered the Islamists, who 
opposed the presence of a non-Muslim army on Islam's holy land. 
Meanwhile, the massive costs of war, coupled with a weakened 
economy, eroded another pillar of Saudi legitimacy - the ability 
to provide socioeconomic stewardship for the people.  Thus, 
facing a drop in their standard of living and declining prospects 
for good jobs, a considerable portion of the country's lower and 
lower-middle classes - chiefly men between the ages of 20 and 
40 - (roughly 21 percent of the population)32 saw their 
aspirations stunted and their manhood and dignity assaulted by 
"atheist" armies and the culture shock of Western lifestyles. 
Indeed, this youthful constituency was caught in an "identity 
crisis" and heightened xenophobia - how to reconcile their 
absolute certainty about Islam's superiority with the kingdom's 
31Dekmejian,  630, 
32See Appendix D. 
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weakness vis-a-vis Iraq and the West.  Hence, the post-war 
resurgence of Islamism was a reaffirmation of identity, a protest 
movement against the monarchy and its Western allies, and for 
some, a means to achieve social influence. 
D.    WHAT ARE THE ISLAMISTS DEMANDING? 
The ideology of the Islamist movement in Saudi Arabia is 
unique compared to other movements in the region.  Islamists in 
Egypt, Algeria and the other Gulf states demand a complete 
transformation of the state into Islamic republics.  The ruling 
regime in Saudi Arabia already views itself as an Islamic state, 
based on the fundamentalist principles of Wahhabi tradition.  But 
the Islamists are demanding stricter implementation of the 
Sharia, which they claim the regime has strayed away from, more 
political participation outside the ruling family, and the 
creation of a constitution and legislative assembly.  They also 
call for the shifting of the government away from its ties to the 
West and back in the direction of fundamental Islam.  Many Saudi 
citizens allying themselves with the Islamists would like to see 
political reform to what they see as a corrupt and inefficient 
system. 
1.  Liberal Petition 
Ironically, the first such demand for political reform did 
not come from the Islamists, but rather from liberals in the 
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country.  In December of 1990, a petition signed by forty-three 
secularists was presented to the King, after he had promised a 
more open government after the war. That petition, unprecedented 
in recent Saudi history, was couched in very deferential and 
supportive terms. 
2.  Islamist Petition 
In May of 1991, over 400 Islamists sent a petition of their 
own to King Fahd calling for political reform.  The apparent aims 
of the letter were to counter the liberal petition, and to 
influence the King's expressed intention to promulgate the much- 
heralded consultative council and system of governance.  A 
further objective was to influence public opinion, as indicated 
by the rapid dissemination of the letter's contents throughout 
the country and the international media.33 
The most important signatures on this petition was Shaykh 
Abd al-Aziz bin Baz's, the senior religious figure in the 
kingdom, and a number of his senior ulama colleagues.  The 
significance of this document is that the Islamists were 
acknowledging for the first time in public the need for the 
monarchy to reform the government because it had become corrupt 
and inefficient. 
The most notable section of the petition was the one that 
dealt with judicial and legal issues.  The signers called for the 
33See Appendix B for the entire context of the petition, 
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establishment of a commission, presumably made up of prominent 
ulama, to examine every state regulation and edict in light of 
Sharia and to cancel those found to conflict with it.  They urged 
unification of the judicial system - which currently consists of 
both Sharia courts and secular authorities empowered to 
adjudicate administrative and commercial cases - under the 
authority of the religious law courts. 
Their demand for the total imposition of the Sharia, to be 
supervised by an "independent" and "unified" judiciary, would 
make the ruling elite subservient to Islamist religious 
authority.  An equally consequential demand was the placement of 
Islamic specialists in every government agency to function as an 
ideological police force.  Such imposition of strict ideological 
controls, resembling the Soviet zampolit system of political 
officers, could result in a clerically-led Islamist state, with 
totalitarian attributes. The establishment of such a policy in 
Saudi Arabia, fully controlled and led by ulama, would be an 
unprecedented feat in Islamic history.  Ironically, this advocacy 
of religio-political pre-eminence for the ulama would bear some 
resemblance to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's theory of vilayat 
al-faqih34 (authority of the religious jurists).  However, 
instead of one person chosen to be the leader of the country, the 
Saudi Islamists would rule by consensus which is more in line 
34Gause, 96. 
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with Sunni tradition.  It is ironic that some of these 
recommendations sound familiar to Khomeini's, but it is important 
to note that the Saudi Islamists see themselves as a totally 
distinct entity from the Islamist movement in Iran.  In fact, 
some of the Islamist leaders have denounced the Shi'a in Saudi 
Arabia as renegades and called for their execution. 
Also significant was the recommendation for a legislative 
assembly to be formed from members outside of the royal family 
and without interference to conduct its affairs.  The legislative 
assembly would have more influence on foreign and defense 
policies.  Specifically, it would build a modern army to defend 
the country from outside threats, and it would cut wasteful 
domestic programs that were draining much of the country's 
resources.  For instance, the country's agriculture accounts for 
nearly ten percent of the budget.  All that is produced could be 
imported much cheaper without wasting the precious water 
resources in the country.  The regime is not able to cut back on 
this program because of the considerable domestic backlash that 
would occur. 
3.  Memorandum of Advice 
The Islamists were not done making demands on the 
government, but they were aware that direct threats to the King 
would be dealt with harshly.  So in September 1992, a second 
letter entitled "Memorandum of Advice from the Ulama" was sent to 
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Shaykh Ibn Baz,  criticizing the government's domestic and 
foreign policies. The memorandum contained an elaboration of the 
May 1991 letter and advanced a new set of more radical demands:35 
1. To remove all government restrictions of 
Islamic clerics, scholars, and teachers to write, 
publish, and preach. 
2. To permit the ulama to oversee and 
participate in the work of all government 
agencies, ministries, and embassies to assure 
their adherence to Islam. 
3. To establish a supreme Sharia constitutional 
court to review, revise, and purify all laws, 
treaties, and regulations in order to assure 
their compatibility with Islam. 
4. To revise the curriculum of some universities 
and institutes to focus on fiqh (jurisprudence) 
and to prohibit the teaching of Western law, 
except to graduate theological students, in such 
a way as to reflect the corrupt ideologies of the 
infidels. 
5. To restrict the powers of the police, provide 
lawyers for the accused, and outlaw torture and 
censorship of Islamist groups and individuals. 
6. To select ministers and high officials 
without favoritism and nepotism, or regional, 
ethnic, and kinship consideration. 
7. To institute administrative reforms by 
appointing capable officials, who would be 
subject to punishment for stealing and bribery, 
regardless of their position. 
8. To censor all foreign materials, magazines and 
television programs to prevent the dissemination 
of infidel and secular ideas and nude pictures. 
35 Dekmejian, 633 
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9. To control and oversee government spending 
through agencies accountable to the consultative 
council. 
10. To cancel expenditures on sports stadiums, 
exhibitions, and palaces, and to extend financial 
aid only to Muslims in need and not to the 
"infidel" regimes of Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Morocco, Russia, Syria, and Tunisia. 
11. To establish a strong army of a half-million 
soldiers, motivated by the spirit of jihad 
(holy war) and sacrifice in order to protect this 
holy country, fight the Jews, and help the 
Muslims. 
If the first document was supportive and one of 
recommendations, this one was critical and one of demands. 
Ironically, this document sometimes contradicted itself by 
calling for the end of censorship of the Islamists, but 
demanding increased censorship on Western and foreign ideas.  It 
brought an immediate denunciation from Ibn Baz, but more 
significantly, these polemical attacks gave the Islamists a 
partial victory, since seven of the seventeen senior ulama 
declined to sign the denunciation issued by Ibn Baz and were 
eventually dismissed by King Fahd in December 1992, and replaced 
by ten pro-government ulama.  This was a clear indication that 
the young Islamists enjoyed considerable support among a large 
minority of establishment ulama, who were prepared to resist the 
regime's dictates. 
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E.  HOW DID THE KING RESPOND? 
The calls for reform in Saudi Arabia have presented the 
monarchy with the classic king's dilemma:  how to modernize the 
country economically while keeping the old political order 
intact. In response, the regime has adopted a two-pronged 
strategy.  On the one hand, the King has reaffirmed the close 
relationship between the government and the religious 
establishment, emphasizing the state's fidelity to the 
principles of Islam.  On the other hand, he has pointed in no 
uncertain terms to limits on religious dissent, cracking down on 
the most vocal critics, and reasserting the government's 
ultimate leadership of religious institutions. 
Specifically, on March 1, 1992, King Fahd announced three 
royal decrees that establish important changes in the Saudi 
domestic political system:  a Basic System of Government, a 
constitution-like document; the statute for a new consultative 
council (majlis al-shura); and a system of regional government 
for the kingdom's fourteen provinces.  On August 20, 1993, the 
King issued four more decrees, appointing the members of the 
Consultative Council, setting out its rules of operation, and 
amending the charter of the Council of Ministers, the Saudi 
cabinet.  These decrees leave the monarchy in control of the 
country while at the same time trying to appeal to a broad 
spectrum of society. 
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The Basic System is an attempt by the monarchy to further 
legitimize the power vested in the King with regards to all 
branches of the government and the military.  It also charges 
the state with the responsibilities to maintain certain 
benefits, such as health care and education, to its citizens 
while also caring for the poor. 
Article 68 of the Basic Law mandates establishment of a 
Consultative Council (majlis al-shura), following on the King's 
promise of November 1990.  The King issued by royal decree the 
founding statute of the council at the same time as he announced 
the Basic System.  That stature sets the membership of the 
Council at sixty members and a president, all appointed by the 
King. (Art. 3)  Councils will have four-year terms, and at least 
one-half of the membership of every council must be composed of 
new members (Art. 13).  No member of the government can sit in 
the council (Art. 9), and from the composition of the first 
council it is clear that ruling family members will not be 
appointed.36 
King Fahd appointed the sixty members of the first 
Consultative Council in his August 20, 1993, decrees; its 
president, former Minister of Justice Shaykh Muhammad ibn 
Jubayr, was chosen in September 1992.  An analysis of the 
Council's membership provides some clues to the kingdom's policy 
36Gause, 106. 
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priorities, as well as its response to the Islamist 
constituency's demands.  The Consultative Council is a 
collectivity of bureaucrats (29.5 percent), academics (27.8 
percent), businessmen (13.1 percent), and Islamic functionaries 
(9.8 percent), plus a handful of journalists, writers, and 
military and police generals.  Overall, the members are highly 
educated; over 50 percent hold doctorates, mostly from U.S. 
universities.  In social background, 25 percent of the members 
are from notable Saudi families, mostly of urban origin; a few 
are affluent businessmen, and the rest are from the urban middle 
class.  The members seem to represent a cross-section of the 
Saudi elite, including important regime constituencies like the 
religious establishment, technocrats, and merchants. 
Approximately one-third of the members are university 
professors, from both the more secular and the Islamic 
universities in the kingdom.  Eight members are current or 
former top-ranking civil servants, four are retired military 
officers, eight are members of various regional chambers of 
commerce in the country.  There are two engineers, three 
doctors, and seven journalists/writers in the group.  Of the 
forty-eight members for whom background information was 
available, twenty-three had received Ph.D.s:  sixteen from 
Western universities, one from Cairo University (in 
engineering), and six from Islamic universities.  At least ten 
Hijazis were appointed, at least four Asiris, and at least two 
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Saudis from the Eastern province.  The Council includes one 
Saudi Shi' i businessman Jamil al-Jishi.37 
There were no royal members in the Consultative Council, 
although the families of at least two members had marriage ties 
to the Saudi family, while the presence of General Abd al-Aziz 
bin Muhammad Al Shaykh provided a legitimizing religio- 
historical link to the Wahhabis.  As the monarchy's home base, 
Nejd received 41 percent of the appointments, Hijaz 32.8 
percent, the South 9.8 percent, and the Eastern Province 6.6 
percent.  In terms of political attitudes, the membership 
appeared to be mostly colorless, although the dominant presence 
of Western-educated bureaucrats, academics, and journalists 
betrayed a muted liberal bias.  In contrast, about 19 percent of 
the members could be considered religious conservatives, as 
determined by their educational background and professional 
involvement with Islamic instruction and institutions; 
predictably, none of these were known as Islamist activists.38 
The third statute announced by King Fahd on March 1, 1992, 
regarded the system of regional governance for the kingdom's 
fourteen provinces.  The statute established greater autonomy 
for provincial governors (all of whom are currently members of 
the royal family) on spending and development priorities in 
37See Appendix E, 
38Dekmejian, 640, 
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their regions, and authorized the establishment of provincial 
consultative council on the model of the national Consultative 
Council. It is billed by the regime as a major effort toward 
decentralized authority in the kingdom.  In September 1993, the 
King appointed the local councils - twenty-member councils for 
the major cities of Riyadh, Mecca, and Medina;  fifteen-member 
councils for the other ten regions.  Included in the local 
councils are the regional representatives of major government 
ministries. 
These constitutional innovations in the Saudi political 
system are an attempt on the part of the King to respond to 
various constituencies important to his rule. Even though the 
King used harsh language on other occasions against Islamists 
whom he saw as transgressing the bounds of permissible dissent, 
he has made it plain that Islam remains the cause of the state's 
legitimacy.  He has repeatedly pointed to the unique role of the 
kingdom in the Muslim world, based on the history of the Al 
Saud's connection with the Wahhabi movement and the family's 
custodianship of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina.  His desire 
to maintain a balance between more liberal and/or technocratic 
elements and the broad Islamist current is reflected in his 
appointments to the Consultative Council. 
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1.  Establishment of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs 
One other act of the King was to form a ministry of Islamic 
affairs to reiterate the regime's commitment to Islam, 
reasserting its right to direct the religious establishment, and 
rewarding those in that establishment loyal to the regime with 
new positions and new access to state employment. In July 1993, 
King Fahd appointed Shaykh ibn Baz to the position of Grand 
Mufti and established a new Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Awqaf, 
Dawa (Proselytization), and Guidance on the recommendation of 
Baz.  This was an attempt by the King to be more Islamic than 
the Islamists. 
In conclusion, despite these unprecedented reforms, the 
monarchy did not give up much power to the Islamists.  All of 
the appointees to the Consultative Council are appointed by the 
King.  And all of the statutes in the Basic System of Government 
only acknowledge and systemize the King's supremacy.  Hence, the 
Islamists in the country were not appeased by the "toothless" 
reforms.  Consequently, as long as the world oil market remains 
depressed, the monarchy will be forced to continue breaking the 
social contract with more of its citizens as it attempts to cut 
back on domestic spending.  Political opposition in Saudi Arabia 
will grow and since the Islamists in Saudi Arabia have a 
monopoly on political opposition, the Islamist movement will 
continue to grow. This presents a gloomy future for the monarchy 
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and may have severe implications for the United States and its 
allies. 
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IV.  PROSPECTS FOR THE OIL MARKET 
The primary factor affecting the political stability in 
Saudi Arabia is the price of oil.  As mentioned earlier, a 
rentier state can survive indefinitely as long as a sufficient 
amount of rents continue to fill government coffers.  However, 
most experts agree that the price of oil will remain depressed 
in the foreseeable future.  If the experts are correct, this 
could be hazardous to the stability of the Saudi monarchy that 
. is unable to reform economically.  In this chapter, I will 
examine the basic nature of the oil market that is intertwined 
between economic, political and military factors.  I will also 
examine Saudi policy, Middle East political changes and other 
factors that may affect the price of oil including the 
reemergence of Iraq onto the world market. Significantly, 
continued low oil prices limit the leverage the King possesses 
to rule the country and casts doubt on the future survivability 
of the ruling regime in Saudi Arabia. 
A.  BASIC NATURE OF THE OIL MARKET 
1.  Demand 
The demand side of the oil market is strictly economic with 
thousands of factors responding to market price signals.  In the 
future, major factors that will affect the oil market include: 
how long it takes the economies of China and India to takeoff, 
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and how long it takes the countries of the former Soviet Union 
to rebuild their economies. These factors are difficult to 
predict, but as the world economy increases, demand for oil will 
grow and then the economy in Saudi Arabia will also grow. 
2.  Supply 
The supply side is not normally competitive, being 
dominated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) cartel, at least since the early 1970s.  This cartel 
control of the oil supply has been the major source of the great 
price volatility since then.  OPEC's attempts to control the oil 
market to maximize its economic rents have produced an unstable 
market.  Before 1973, current dollar oil prices were essentially 
flat, while constant dollar prices were slowly declining.  Oil 
prices shot up during the crises of 1973 (OPEC oil embargo) and 
1979 (Iranian revolution).  Since then they have declined - 
plunging in 198 6 when Saudi Arabia dropped its swing producer 
role and currently are roughly where they were in 1973 in real 
terms.  Presently, the threat of anti-American regimes running 
up the price of oil is not very likely.  With Saudi Arabia 
refusing to act as the "swing producer" and Kuwait coming back 
on line, as well as, Iraq and Russia beginning to produce more 
oil, there is an abundance of oil available in the world.  So 
unlike the past when political variables dictated the price of 
oil, the international market will now set the price. 
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B.  SAUDI POLICY 
Before 1986 Saudi Arabia's role in the international oil 
market was that of "swing producer".  The Saudis would increase 
or decrease their production output to balance the market and 
maintain prices at the set OPEC level.  Unfortunately, other 
members of OPEC took advantage of the situation by developing 
sophisticated methods of cheating on prices by varying contract 
terms to facilitate intra-cartel competition. The swing producer 
role caused a sharp drop in the Saudi share of OPEC production 
despite its position as the largest oil reserve country in the 
world.  By late 1985, Saudi oil production had declined to the 
point where it had reduced the production of associated natural 
gas to below the level of Saudi domestic gas requirements.39 
Saudi officials recognized that the country's economy could 
not tolerate this decline and pulled the plug on the oil market 
in 1986.  They not only dropped the swing role but also adopted 
net back pricing to compete with other producers both in and out 
of OPEC.  (Under net back pricing, the price paid for the crude 
is the published market value of the products it yields less its 
transportation cost, refining cost, and a normal refining 
profit.)   By protecting refiners against price rise in a time 
of declining prices, this policy change by Riyadh elicited a 
39David Vance.  "The Oil Market in the Long Run:  Economic 
Fundamentals vs. Political Factors."  United States Department of 
State Intelligence Report, 1994, 5. 
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dramatic increase in Saudi production, but it also produced a 
sharp drop in oil prices as other producers were forced to adopt 
the same pricing policy. 
By late 1986, OPEC members, in an attempt to control prices 
by controlling production, set new quotas which were supposed to 
be the maximum production allowed each member country.  These 
caps stopped the price slide and even brought some recovery. 
Since 198 6, however, Saudi Arabia has been determined never 
again to be swing producer but to defend its shares of the OPEC 
and world oil markets. 
According to Vance, this policy switch was successful in 
stopping the drop in Saudi production and market share, but the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is what gave Saudi Arabia a chance to 
increase its share to its current level.  At the request of the 
United States, the Saudis increased production to near capacity, 
in order to avoid large price increases.  As other sources of 
oil producers develop or come back online, Saudi Arabia will 
have to once again decrease production, or the price of oil will 
surely drop. However, the lessons of 198 6 and the Gulf War 
underpin Saudi Arabia's distrust of its OPEC compatriots and 
extreme reluctance to cut production except on a pro rata basis 
for all members. 
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C. MIDDLE EAST POLITICAL CHANGES 
In the past, all of the large price increases have followed 
political or military events that threatened severe disruptions 
in oil supplies to consuming countries.  OPEC has neither the 
ability nor the motive (in terms of its larger producer's self- 
interest) to push prices up rapidly without such a crisis. 
The end of the Cold War and decisive action by the United 
States and its Western allies during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990-91 seems to have reduced the chance of an external 
crisis in the area.  Nevertheless, the major remaining external 
threats are still Iran and Iraq which could threaten political 
overthrow of some Middle Eastern governments.  On balance, the 
chance of a major disruption in oil supply in the foreseeable 
future does not seem very high today, as long as, the United 
States remains committed to the security of these countries. 
D. SHORT TERM PRICES 
In the short term, if there is no political volatility in 
the region, prices will probably remain flat or even decrease. 
The most likely crude oil price path for the foreseeable future 
is flat at roughly today's level, i.e., within a dollar or so 
either side of $15 per barrel.  The economic case for this 
expectation is that there is abundant oil at that price, finding 
costs are likely to continue declining because of technological 
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progress, and OPEC can extract some economic rents but will be 
constrained by the market from going too far (it would pay a 
price in instability for any attempt to go too far, as it did in 
the 1980's).  Most oil market analysts who predict price turmoil 
in the near future tend to emphasize political/institutional 
factors:  limitations on investment in capacity so that growing 
demand leads to severe market tightness, OPEC mistakes and 
disagreements, increased dependence on Persian Gulf producers, 
and political/military crises.40 
E.  FACTORS THAT MAY KEEP OIL PRICES DOWN 
Looming on the horizon is the reentry of several countries 
into the oil markets.  Iraq, especially, has vast petroleum 
reserves and pressing financial needs.  And the Iraqis are even 
less likely now than before the war to adhere to OPEC quotas. 
Iran with its economy shattered by the revolution and its eight- 
year war with Iraq has announced ambitious development goals. 
Higher oil exports are essential.  Iranian aspirations to 
increase production were temporarily deterred when the Clinton 
administration banned CONACO, an American oil company, from 
doing business with the Iranians.  Nevertheless, it will not 
take the Iranians long to replace the American firm with another 
one, probably from Europe or Asia. 
40Vance, 8. 
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Kuwait in particular is lobbying for a much larger oil 
production quota.  Kuwait's determination will most certainly 
clash with Saudi Arabia's high level of production and with 
Iraq's eventual return to world oil markets as an exporting 
nation.  Kuwait says it badly needs the money to make up the 
losses from the war which cost it $65 billion and cut deeply 
into its assets of nearly $100 billion.  The Kuwaitis say that 
with planned expenditures of $8 to $10 billion over two years 
they will further raise output to 2 million barrels a day by the 
end of 1992.  Kuwait's output was 1.5 billion to 2 million 
barrels a day before the Iraqi invasion of August 1990.41 
The announced expansion of capacity by Abu Dhabi, Venezuela 
and Nigeria as well as by smaller exporters will surely add to 
the downward pressure on prices, as will the reemergence of the 
former Soviet Republics in Central Asia.  Also, the recent oil 
finds in Yemen and the North Sea may be sizable. 
The fundamental issue of reintegrating Iraq into the OPEC 
marketing structure has to be addressed on a serious level. 
Iraq is currently barred from exporting oil by United Nations 
sanctions, and its production allocation under the arrangement 
is for domestic consumption only.  However, by early 1992, the 
country was capable of producing two million barrels per day. 
41Robert E.  Looney.  "The Gulf War and the Price of Oil: 
Prospects for the Medium Term."  The Journal of Social, Political 
and Economic Studies.  Volume 17, Numbers 3 & 4, 
Fall/Winter 1992,  298. 
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If the return of Iraq and Kuwait to full production is not to 
plunge the oil market into crisis, other members will have to 
agree to significant cuts. 
F.  WHY IRAQ WILL REMAIN A THREAT 
Saddam Husayn invaded Kuwait for many reasons, but most 
were economic.  During the decade of the 1980's, Iraq spent 
approximately $100 billion on its military.  By mid-1990 the 
country had accumulated an international debt of approximately 
$90 billion, on which interest payments amounted to some $8-10 
billion per year.  With world oil prices at $20 per barrel, 
exports of 3 mbd would generate less than $20 billion per year 
in revenues.  Moreover, by June 1990, with both Iran's and 
Iraq's oil exports having increased following the end of their 
bloody war in 1988, oil prices had slumped to as low as $13 per 
barrel.  At that figure, Iraq would earn approximately $14 
billion per year, barely enough to cover debt service and 
imports of necessities.42  Given the costs of reconstruction 
following the Iran-Iraq War, the demands of the Iraqi economy 
and popular expectations, and Saddam's continuing and grandiose 
military spending predilections, the Iraqi leader sought means 
of increasing his country's revenues.  Thus the resources and 
income afforded by the seizure of Kuwait, as well as the 
2Looney, 290. 
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prospect of exerting leverage over Saudi Arabia and hence 
influence over world oil prices, offered a tempting target for 
the Iraqi leader. 
In the aftermath of the Gulf War and continuing United 
Nations sanctions on oil exports, Iraq's economy has had an 
acute need for oil revenues.  This reality provides some 
opportunity for external actors to influence that country's 
conduct.  Sooner or later, however, Iraq will resume oil 
exports.  When it does, the amounts involved can grow rather 
quickly.  Indeed, just two months after the war ended, a CIA 
estimate concluded that within three months after restrictions 
were lifted, Iraq could be producing one mbd.  And, with the 
investment of an additional $1.5 billion to repair pumping 
facilities, output could have reached 2.7 mbd by the end of 
1992.43 
Given Iraq's indebtedness, estimated costs of $30 billion 
to repair destruction caused by the latest war, and UN-mandated 
reparations of as much as $50 billion to pay for the destruction 
and looting in Kuwait, Iraq will continue to have a pressing 
long-term need for export revenues.  This provides motivation 
for Saddam, or his eventual successors, to seek ways of 
43Robert J. Lieber.  "Oil and Power After the Gulf War." 
International Security.  Summer 1992,Volume 17:1, 168-169. 
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encouraging higher world oil prices.44 Moreover, it also 
suggest an underlying danger.  It is that, barring major changes 
in existing circumstances, Iraq will have its own reasons for 
seeking to intimidate its neighbors.  Apart from efforts to 
shape oil production and pricing policies, the aims of such 
pressure could also include obtaining financial assistance (in 
less polite terms, blackmail), influencing other countries' 
defense and foreign policies, and causing changes in the 
internal regime structure of adjacent states. 
As long as the united States remains committed to regional 
security, whether in terms of troop presence or via longer-term 
security arrangements with an unambiguous American commitment, 
this potential intimidation from Iraq will not have much effect. 
The role played by the United States was unique in opposing the 
Iraqi takeover of Kuwait, in orchestrating United Nations 
condemnation and sanctions, and finally in leading an 
international coalition in a brief, devastating war against 
Iraq.  However, if the United States proves unable to sustain a 
long-term commitment, or if regional states are unwilling or 
unable to collaborate in the maintenance of it, then Iraq will 
eventually find ways to reassert strength within the region. 
Under such circumstances, the regime of Saddam Husayn (or a 
"Though higher oil prices would help the Saudis, an attempt 
by Saddam to increase his influence over any part of the 
peninsula to consolidate the oil reserves and increase the price 
would be regarded as a threat by the nervous Saudi regime. 
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successor regime with comparable interests and values) will 
continue to threaten both long-term regional stability and the 
prevailing Persian Gulf oil regimes.  Even in the absence of 
this threat, there would remain internal and external sources of 
instability, for example Islamists and the uncertain nature of 
Iran's role, nonetheless, Saddam and Iraq represent a 
demonstrably significant danger to their neighbors. 
In conclusion the long-term pattern of the oil market, 
along with the broader stability of the Middle East, depends on 
a complex interplay of elements that are economic, political, 
and military.  Such factors as the fate of the Ba'athist regime 
of Saddam Husayn, the availability of oil revenues to finance a 
rearming of Iraq, the durability of the U.S. commitment to 
regional security, the role of Saudi Arabia and the stability of 
its regime, the pattern of long term oil and energy demand 
outside the region, increasing Russian and other sources of oil 
production, and the risk of renewed warfare within the region 
can all interact.  In other words, there exists such a myriad of 
influences on the oil market that it is difficult to forecast. 
Nevertheless, most analysts predict steady or even decreasing 
oil prices at least until the turn of the century. This prospect 
is not very encouraging to the Saudi regime whose future becomes 
more precarious as the price of oil drops. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, decreasing oil prices in the 1980s and 1990s 
have significantly weakened the stability of the ruling regime 
in Saudi Arabia.  If as most experts agree the price of oil 
remains flat, then the regime could be on the verge of collapse. 
Ultimately, as long as the United States remains committed 
to the security of the ruling regime in Saudi Arabia, then the 
possibility of an external threat disrupting political stability 
in Saudi Arabia is small.  However, if an Islamist threat arises 
internally, such as what happened to the Shah of Iran in the 
late 1970s, there is little that the United States can do to 
protect the ruling regime.  In this case, the monarchy faces a 
serious dilemma, how to reform economically while not giving up 
any political power. 
A. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
A number of scenarios could possibly occur in the kingdom. 
First, the monarchy could maintain the present situation of 
authoritarian rule while granting concessions to the Islamists, 
hoping that these reforms will be enough to appease these 
groups. Or the King could resort to political repression, using 
the coercive power of the state to keep himself in power and 
suppress opposition.  Israel, Syria and Egypt have all 
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successfully used repression against opponents in the region. 
Singapore is another example of a country that is led by a 
strong leader who uses repression against opponents while 
modernizing the country.  Repression would be a dangerous choice 
for the King, since he uses Islamic symbols to justify his 
regime by proclaiming to be the custodian of holy places, 
cracking down on internal Islamic groups would undoubtedly hurt 
the legitimacy of the regime. 
The third choice would be to implement real political 
reforms.45 This would mean that the monarchy would have to 
share some of its political power with other groups.  In the 
past, political reforms from authoritarian governments have led 
to the demise of those governments, i.e., the Soviet Union and 
Iran.  There is an old saying in the Middle East, "a reforming 
monarchy is the last monarchy."  Needless to say, sharing power 
is probably the last thing the monarchy will do. 
Faced with an impossible situation and no easy solutions, 
the future for the Saudi monarchy looks dismal.  Presently, the 
Islamist groups are only calling for political reform.  However, 
if the oil market remains depressed and social conditions 
continue to deteriorate, and the Islamists continue to see the 
regime as corrupt and straying away from the tenets of Islam, 
45Either policy, reform or repressive, would likely spill 
over Saudi borders and have a negative impact on the stability of 
regimes in neighboring countries. 
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the likely situation may be some kind of Islamic takeover. 
B.  CONSEQUENCES FOR OTHER COUNTRIES 
1. GCC States 
The effects of an Islamist takeover would be more dramatic 
on the other countries on the Arabian Peninsula than the United 
States.  First, for the other members of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), the future would be bleak.  All of these 
countries Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates are also led by monarchs or shaykhs.  An Islamic 
takeover in Saudi Arabia not only sets a bad precedent for these 
small countries, but it also directly affects their national 
security.  All of these countries have two things in common, 
small populations and enormous natural resources.  These two 
factors make them an inviting target from hostile outside powers 
such as Iran and Iraq.  Historically, Saudi Arabia has been the 
protector of these countries from other outside powers.  If the 
supportive regime in Saudi disappears, then the opportunity for 
Iran, Iraq or Saudi Arabia itself to prey on these tiny, weak 
countries becomes a likely scenario. 
2. United States 
The main American national interest in the region is the 
continued easy access to inexpensive oil.  In the short run, an 
Islamic takeover would probably produce an anti-American regime 
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and may disrupt the flow of oil and cause prices to skyrocket. 
Ironically, the majority of the oil in the region would be under 
control of the three indigenous superpowers of the region, 
(Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia) all hostile to the United States. 
However, unlike in the past, the threat of anti-American regimes 
running up the price of oil for any length of time is not very 
likely.  With Saudi Arabia refusing to act as the "swing 
producer" and Kuwait coming back on line, as well as, Iraq and 
Russia beginning to produce more oil, there is an abundance of 
oil available in the world.  So unlike the past when political 
variables dictated the price of oil, the international market 
will now set the price.  More significantly, anti-American 
groups not only have to sell the oil to the West, but they are 
willing to.  For example, Iran is the most anti-American regime, 
but their recent dealings this year with the American oil 
company CONACO prove that they are more than willing to do 
business with the West.  It was not the Iranians who terminated 
the deal with CONACO, it was the Clinton administration that 
refused to allow the American firm to do business with Iran. 
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C.  IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN POLICY 
The United States should not overreact to internal 
instability problems in Saudi Arabia.  Like in "revolutionary" 
Iran, oil will continue to be sold, regardless of the future 
political outcome.  With that stated, one of the secondary 
interests of the United States should be the sustained political 
stability on the peninsula.  More specifically, the United 
States should avoid becoming a factor itself, that ignites 
political instability.  If an internal crisis arises in the 
kingdom, then there is little the U.S. can do to aid the Saudis. 
On the other hand, the United States can help by adopting 
foreign policies that do not directly or indirectly apply 
unnecessary political pressure on the regime.  For example, two 
of the tenants of the American National Security Doctrine are 
support for human rights and the promotion of democracy 
throughout the world.  The United States should encourage the 
Saudis to respect the human rights of their citizens and 
expatriate workers residing in the country. 
However, the United States should not push for a liberal 
democracy in a country that does not possess any of the 
necessary pre-requisites.  Saudi Arabia does not have an 
advanced economic system, a vast and/or stable middle class or 
the tradition from which democracy has evolved.  The likely 
outcome would be the "one man, one vote, one time" kind of 
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election. 
Next, the United States needs a more even-handed Middle 
Eastern policy.  The Saudis, like many other Arab countries, 
would like to see the Palestinian problem disappear, so they are 
willing to support the ongoing peace talks.  Irrational, blind 
support for Israel just turns public opinion against the United 
States in the Arab world, which in turn, puts more pressure on 
regimes that are friendly to the United States, i.e., the 
Saudis. 
Third, the United States should not force Saudi Arabia to 
bail out its sagging defense industry.  Arms sales become a 
problem for internal stability when vast resources spent on arms 
purchases are perceived as cutting into domestic social spending 
and hurting the local economy.  Not only are massive arms 
purchases seen as made at the expense of other, more immediate 
needs, but they make a mockery of U.S. proposals to control the 
arms race in the region between Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
The best solution for the United States is to encourage the 
Saudis to become more efficient with the high tech weapons they 
have, instead of spending billions on further sophisticated 
Western weapons. 
Finally, the United States should not push for increased 
military presence in Saudi Arabia.  The Middle East is a region 
that for centuries has been dominated by external powers. 
First, the Ottoman Empire and then the British Empire both 
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colonized areas on the peninsula for their own agendas.  For 
this reason, people are suspicious of any outside influence in 
their country, especially from the West whose culture is so 
different from their own. Military bases and presences in Saudi 
Arabia would serve as lightning rods for domestic opposition to 
the ruling regime.  They allow the Islamists to call into 
question the sovereignty of the country and accuse the regime of 
being puppets of the American government. 
Recent experience in the Persian Gulf provides the United 
States with some guidelines for how to go about maintaining a 
military presence without upsetting domestic stability.  First, 
maintaining a strong naval presence in the Gulf, allows the 
United States to have powerful strike capabilities, without 
offending the local populations.  Next, properly protected pre- 
positioned units (bases and ships) significantly reduce the 
amount of time required to move equipment to the scene. 
Finally, joint exercises with Saudi-American forces allow the 
allies to become familiar with one another and carry less 
political risks than actual bases. 
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APPENDIX A:  SAUDI ARABIAN GDP (IN BILLIONS OF SAUDI RIYAL) 
YEAR GDP YEAR GDP 
1963 8.67 1977 205.06 
1964 9.32 1978 225.40 
1965 10.40 1979 326.89 
1966 11.94 1980 490.94 
1967 13.14 1981 561.14 
1968 14.66 1982 458.12 
1969 15.98 1983 373.88 
1970 17.40 1984 351.40 
1971 23.42 1985 313.94 
1972 28.26 1986 271.09 
1973 40.55 1987 275.45 
1974 99.32 1988 285.15 
1975 136.60 1989 310.82 
1976 164.53 
Source:  IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook-1991 
(Washington, D.C.:  IMF, 1992), pp. 640-641. 
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APPENDIX B:  ISLAMIC PETITION OF MAY 1991 
1. The council should consist of individuals with diverse 
specializations who are known for their sincerity (ikhlas) and 
upright behavior (istiqamah) and are given total independence to 
conduct the affairs of the majlis without interference. 
2. Elimination of all political, administrative, and 
economic laws and regulations that contradict the Sharia 
(religious law). 
3. Manifestation of upright conduct, sincerity, and 
honesty by all state officials and representatives both within 
and without the country, in addition to their possession of 
expertise.  The violation of these requirements, under any 
circumstance, will cause the loss of trust (amanah) and will 
harm the country's interests and reputation. 
4. Realization of justice and equality among all members of 
society in fully attaining their rights and duties regardless of 
one's high or low status.  The exploitation of one's influence 
to avoid performing one's duties and to violate the rights of 
others is the cause of the fragmentation of society and its 
destruction, about which the Prophet warned. 
5. Supervision and strict accountability of all officials 
without exception, especially those who occupy influential 
positions, and cleansing of the state apparatus of corrupt 
individuals, regardless of any other consideration. 
6. Establishment of justice in the distribution of the 
national wealth among all social classes.  Cancellation of all 
taxes and reduction of fees, conservation of the nation's 
resources from waste and exploitation, and the giving of 
priority attention to immediate needs.  The abolition of all 
forms of monopoly and illegally-acquired wealth, and the lifting 
of restrictions on Islamic banks.  The purification of public 
and private financial institutions from usury (riba), which is 
warring against God and his Prophet and causes the disappearance 
of God's blessing (baraka). 
7. The building of a strong army equipped with weapons 
from diverse sources and the (local) manufacture and improvement 
of arms.  This army's goal is to protect the country and its 
holy places. 
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8. Reformation of the mass media in accordance with the 
kingdom's policy to serve Islam and to reflect the ethics of 
society, elevating its culture, and purging the media of 
everything not conforming to these objectives, with a guarantee 
of its freedom to spread awareness through accurate news and 
constructive criticism within the limits of the Sharia. 
9. Development of a foreign policy to protect the interests 
of the ummah (Muslim community), avoiding alliances that violate 
the Sharia, adopting Muslim causes and rectifying the status of 
embassies to reflect the Islamic nature of this country. 
10. The improvement of the country's institutions of 
religion and religious dissemination, granting them material and 
human resources, and removing all constraints that might prevent 
them from fully performing their tasks. 
11. Unification of all judicial institutions, granting them 
total and actual independence. Extension of the authority of the 
courts over the whole of society and the creation of an 
independence agency whose task is to oversee enforcement of 
judicial decisions. 
12. Guaranteeing the rights of the individual and society, 
eliminating all traces of harassment of the people's will and 
their rights in order to assure human dignity within the 
Sharia's limitations. 
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Appendix C:  PROFILE OF THE ISLAMISTS ELITE 
The following is a composite profile of leading Salafi 
personalities drawn from the lists of the 52 signers of the May 






Reaional Affiliation Number Percent 
Najd 33 63.5 
Hijaz 7 13.5 
South 6 11.5 
Eastern Province 4 7.7 
Unknown 2 3.8 
Occupation 
'Al im 5 9.6 
Judge 7 13.5 
Academic 21 40.4 
Businessman 1 2.0 
Religious Institute 5 9.6 
Head 
Mosque Imam 8 15.4 
Notable/Teacher -- — 
Unknown 5 9.6 
University Affiliation 
8 Imam Muhammad bin Saud 15.4 
(Riyadh) 
King Saud (Riyadh) 7 13.5 
Umm al-Qura (Mecca) 4 7.7 
Islamic (Medina) 2 3.8 
Unknown 31 60.0 
Education 
Doctorate 20 38.5 
































Source:  Dekmejian, 636, 
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Appendix D: 1990 POPULATION GRAPH 
AGE GROUP POPULATION(in thous) PERCENTAGE 
MALE FEMALE OF POPULATION 
0-4 1300 1250 17.8% 
5-9 1100 1050 14.7% 
10-14 900 900 12.3% 
15-19 700 700 9.6% 
20-24 600 550 7.9% 
25-29 600 400 6.8% 
30-34 700 300 6.8% 
35-39 600 300 6.2% 
40-44 400 300 4.8% 
45-49 350 200 3.8% 
50-54 250 200 3.1% 
55-59 200 150 2.4% 
60-64 150 100 1.7% 
65-69 50 50 .7% 
70 AND UP 100 100 1.4% 
Source:  Saudi Arabia Country Study, 1993. 
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Appendix E:  PROFILE OF THE MAJLIS AL-SHURA (61=TOTAL) 
Recrional Affiliation Number Percent 
Najd 25 41.0 
Hijaz 20 32.8 
South 6 9.8 
Eastern Province 4 6.6 
Unknown 6 9.8 
Occupation Number Percent 
Bureaucrats/Technocrats 18 29.5 
Academics 17 27.8 
Businessmen 8 13.1 
Islamic Officials 6 9.8 
Journalists/Writers 4 6.6 
Military/Police 4 6.6 
Generals 
Unknown 4 6.6 
Source:  Dekmejian, 640. 
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Appendix F:  CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES (MILLIONS 
OF BARRELS PER DAY) 
Producers Dec 1989 


































































Source:  Data from Lieber article, calculated from Monthly 
Energy Review (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Department of Energy, 
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